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Abstract
In a platform ecosystem, complementors can utilize
various resources from a platform owner that receives
a variety of products/services via complementors for
better customers’ choice and satisfaction. The literature
has focused on the cooperative nature of the platform
ecosystem. Less attention, however, has been given to
coopetition (i.e., simultaneous strategic use of
cooperation and competition). Drawing upon paradox
theory, this study develops a research model that
explains the individual and joint impact of coopetition
balance and coopetition capability on relationship
performance in a platform ecosystem. Based on survey
data from 365 complementors to Amazon, this study
illustrates that coopetition balance and coopetition
capability have a significant impact on relationship
performance. Additionally, coopetition capability
moderates the relationship between coopetition balance
and relationship performance. In particular, results
show that coopetition capability is the most critical
variable to enhance relationship performance.
Theoretical and practical implications are discussed in
this paper.

1. Introduction
Platform-based markets have been prevalent
recently in various fields such as smartphones, video
game consoles, search engines, or e-commerce [11, 30,
34]. As the effectiveness of the platform ecosystem
relies on dynamic interactions among consumers,
complementors, and a platform owner, their partnership
has been emphasized [15, 21]. A large number of
entrepreneurs, serving as complementors to a platform,
have established their businesses by utilizing the
technical, managerial, and logistical infrastructure of a
platform.
This collaboration, however, has been polluted by a
platform’s entry into complementors’ product markets.
Studies have reported that complementors have been
pushed out of their product space, not by competitors
but by a platform owner [34]. As complementors depend
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heavily on having access to customers and resources
through a platform, they are exposed to the risk of the
asymmetric relationship. The literature finds that
Amazon’s direct competition with complementors
results in reduced shipping cost, implying benefits for
customers on the contrary to the welfare of
complementors [34]. This emergence of competition in
a platform ecosystem has certainly hindered small thirdparty sellers to grow in their businesses.
While direct competition with a platform owner
would be adverse conditions, complementors should
accept instead of ignoring coopetition and rather see a
new opportunity by generating synergies over the
paradoxical coexistence of cooperation and
competition. Studies argue that competition seems to
deteriorate cooperation at a given point in time, but the
dynamic association between cooperation and
competition will reinforce firms over time [15]. As firms
need to oscillate between cooperation and competition,
the purpose of this study is to examine the individual
and joint impact of coopetition balance and coopetition
capability, both of which mitigate negative tensions of
coopetition, on relationship performance in the context
of a platform ecosystem.
The present study contributes to providing insights
into coopetition for academicians and practitioners.
First, this study adds value to the body of the coopetition
literature. Studies have focused on cooperative
behaviors for value creation or examined competitive
dynamics for superiority separately [20]. In other words,
limited attention has been given to coopetition,
simultaneous strategic use of cooperation and
competition [2, 15]. The literature accordingly calls for
coopetition research, and this study provides an in-depth
account of coopetition with a theory-driven research
model and an empirical test.
Second, the present study contributes to enhancing
understandings of coopetition with a contextual focus
on a platform-based market. Researchers have
emphasized cooperative dynamics in the platform
business model [21]. Complementors, however, has less
direct access to customers and more reliance on a
platform’s
resources,
indicating
asymmetric
relationships. Consequently, their capacity to cope with
a wide spectrum of a platform’s strategic positioning is
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critical. As the interplay of cooperation and competition
would create or damage value cocreation, favorable
conditions for complementors to facilitate positive
performance should be investigated [15]. This study
sheds light on offering a strategic guidance for
complementors.
Third, the present study provides explanations to the
literature by explicating how mixed results of
coopetition can be reconciled. As firms seek to
accomplish the best of cooperation and competition,
there inevitably exists tensions between the two
paradoxical coexistence. The two conflicting demands
also result in differing outcomes: positive and negative
[2]. It is important for firms to strike a right balance
while
pursing
cooperation
and
competition
simultaneously, but the current literature falls short of
offering meaningful insights. In addition, coopetition
capability is known to mitigate tensions arising from
simultaneous cooperation and competition [1], but not
many empirical studies are reported. This study
examines coopetition balance and coopetition capability
and investigates how their interactions escalate positive
results from coopetition.

2. Theoretical foundation: Paradoxical
coexistence in coopetition
The theory of paradox provides a theoretical
foundation for coopetition. In the increasingly
competitive, fast-paced environment, two conflicting
demands are frequently requested to pursue jointly,
often called as paradoxes, as part of adaptive capacity
for survival and sustainability at the individual, team,
and organizational levels: knowledge management
(exploitation vs. exploration), strategy (cooperation vs.
competition), organizational structure (centralization vs.
decentralization),
governance
(relational
vs.
contractual), operations (quality excellence vs.
innovation), teamwork (task- vs. relational oriented),
employees life (work vs. home), and leadership (control
vs. empowerment) [16]. Paradox is defined as
“contradictory yet interrelated elements that exists
simultaneously and persist over time” [29, p. 382]. As
indicated, the concept entails the simultaneity and
persistence of tensions between two competing goals
[28], and complementors in the platform ecosystem are
expected to manage ostensibly incompatible
perspectives (i.e., cooperation and competition) for
sustaining competitiveness. As paradoxes defy
resolutions, scholars suggest three steps for manage it
effectively, and those are insightful for complementors:
(1) accepting, (2) accommodating, and (3)
differentiating/integrating [28]. Accepting is related to
“learning to live with the paradox” [17, p. 764]

Accommodating is associated with “defining a novel,
creative synergy that addresses both oppositional
elements
together”
[28,
p.
1594].
Differentiating/integrating includes “honoring unique
aspects of each notion” and combining them for
synergies and linkages [28, p. 1594].
In the technical sense, a platform is defined as “an
extensible technological foundation and the interfaces
used by extensions that interoperate with it” [31, p. 267].
Also, platform ecosystems are describes as “a platform
and its collection of complementary extensions” [31, p.
267]. This context can be well understood with the App
store at Apple. However, we would like to focus more
on an e-marketplace, “an Internet platform-based
market through which both sides of an exchange –
buyers and sellers – conduct transactions” [18, p. 209].
In this platform environment, platform owners provide
technical, managerial, and logistical infrastructure to
complementors (i.e., third-party sellers) that in turn
supply a variety of products to the platform.
Paradoxes carry illogical elements that generate
uncertainty and ambiguity, and they enhance tensions
cognitively or emotionally [28]. In the context of a
platform ecosystem, complementors would be pressured
with the entry into a product space by a platform owner.
Tension is a double-edged sword that could generate
innovative, optimistic behaviors, while significantly
escalating needless stress, unnecessary frustration, and
counterproductive defenses [22]. In other words, it can
create a virtuous cycle that complementors identify new
opportunities, integrate necessary resources, develop a
new solution, and continue to sustain their competitive
advantage. On the other hand, tension can fuel
frustration, confusion, and defenses for complementors.
Two views have been reported when facing tensions:
“dilemma” and “natural and persistent” [22]. The
dilemma view sees tensions as tradeoffs, indicating that
an organization/individual gives up one over the other
with the idea of either/or. The “natural and persistent”
view illustrates that firms are required to have ongoing
responses rather than one-time resolution [28]. The
“natural and persistent” view may appear as
opportunities that escalate learning and adaptability [22,
28]. This study takes the view of “natural and persistent”
as complementors should continually adjust their
tensions with the proper relationship with a platform
owner.

3. What is coopetition?
Given that a half of cooperation occurs among
competitors, cooperation and competition are
inseparably intertwined [3]. The two research streams,
however, have evolved independently, and the literature
has recently acknowledged the need for combining them
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simultaneously [15]. The literature defines coopetition
as competing without killing the opposition and
cooperating without ignoring self-interest [4].
Coopetition has been noticed in two different paths.
Competition proceeds cooperation or vice versa [15]. At
times, firms find themselves in working with their
competitors with the pooling of increased
complementarity of resources and synergetic
combinations of market- or industry-specific expertise.
They build trust with long-time rivals to mitigate price
competition for general economic welfare and expand
new markets and novel technologies by sharing risks.
Coopetition, on the other hand, has been established
from cooperation to competition. Firms pursue a
coopetition strategy, especially when they need (1)
technical capabilities, (2) share knowledge and
resources, work together for events, technical standards,
regulations, and (3) create oneness or we-ness, (4)
create/expand new markets, and (5) collude on price [4,
20]. When the market matures, organizations see
cooperation as inefficient strategy and move toward
competition for financial optimization [20].
A stream of the coopetition study has flowed into
illuminating its antecedents and consequences, although
it is quite overlapped with separate studies on
cooperation and competition. Antecedents to
coopetition include risk reduction, cost sharing, and
resource access and pooling [3, 15]. Additionally, the
literature presents consequences of coopetition such as
better performance, incremental/radical innovations,
and the diversity of technology [3, 15, 26].
Another focus on coopetition is its impact on value
creation or value appropriation [13]. Studies have
elaborated on outcomes of coopetition as its polarized
interferences, beneficial or hurtful, have been made.
Coopetition would generate joint value creation,
individual firm value creation, or value destruction for
both parties [13]. A firm can have more or lesser value
than its partners, or costs from coopetitive relationships
are much higher than benefits.
Also, research context for coopetition studies should
be mentioned. A triadic relationship among a buyer and
two suppliers was examined for coopetition in the
context of supply chain network [24, 32]. In the small
and medium sized enterprise context, coopetition was
examined. Small craft beer firms compete with each
other while cooperating together against mass producers
[20]. Similar to the present study, coopetition between
complementors and a platform owner was examined in
the context of platform-based market [34].
Based upon the paradox theory, tensions are
inevitably generated when contradictory concepts meet
with each other, and positive/negative consequences of
the tension are contingent on context and a firm’s
management [2]. Complementors in the platform

ecosystem cannot be exceptional, and need to properly
manage it. To mitigate negative tensions for
complementors, this study presents two important
capacities: coopetition balance and coopetition
capability.

4. What is coopetition balance?
The literature defines coopetition balance as
“evenness between competition and cooperation” [13, p.
2522]. The concept can be thought of as the parity
between the two paradoxical coexistence. It is the status
when a firm finds a harmony between the conflicting
forces while pursuing the two seemingly differing goals
simultaneously. The main purpose of the contradictory
pursuit lies in concurrently accomplishing goals that
cooperate to create value together beyond a firm’s
capacity by leveraging resources from alliance partners
and that compete to capture more shares of a joint value
created with better quality and performance [4, 15]. In
other words, cooperation and competition for
complementors in the platform ecosystem are in need of
being reasonably balanced in their collaboration.
Without adequate cooperation, there is no existence of
alliance, and without sufficient attention to competition,
alliances would unwittingly lose their competitive
advantage.
In the context of the platform ecosystem, part of
interorganizational relationships, there is a tendency to
view that value creation is related to cooperation and
value appropriation is associated with competition [15].
The bottom line of the argument lies in the
understanding that cooperation and competition have
inherent trade-offs. This view, however, is not always
the case, as literature presents the “natural and
persistent” view. Competition in the complementorplatform relationship can help complementors develop
their potential, enhance operational excellence, and
generate more innovations, all of which are related to
value creation to the firm and customers.
Certainly, the interplay of cooperation and
competition would either create or destroy values, and
thus the academic community attempts to find boundary
conditions resulting in good outcomes. While avoiding
the risk of undermining cooperation due to competition,
the issue of striking an appropriate balance is essential.
The tension management through coopetition balance is
an imperative task to achieve desired outcomes.

5. What is coopetition capability?
Despite possibly beneficial effects of coopetition,
the paradoxical coexistence of cooperation and
competition would generate potentials to deteriorate
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trust between partners and even break partnership. In
line with coping with negative tensions of coopetition,
the literature has also presented coopetition capability
that could defend competition threats or dampen
undesirable impacts of coopetition. Coopetition
capability is an organization’s capability that manages
interorganizational relationships in order to properly
confront contradicting realities, and it is defined as “the
ability to think paradoxically and to initiate processes
that help firms attain and maintain a moderate level of
tension, irrespective of the strength of the paradox” [1,
p. 19]. It is also described as “evaluative capabilities”
[32] in which firms assess situations, make sense of their
strategic pursuit, and position properly for better firm
performance. Especially, coopetition capability can be a
crucial capacity that complementors should possess in
case they face competition with a platform owner as part
of reducing competitive tensions and producing
effective strategic positioning. The capability is not
static but dynamic, given that complementors need to
continually assess the scope of their cooperation and
competition according to changing relationships.
Researchers have acknowledged “swimming with
sharks” that large firms are strongly motivated to
misappropriate value created through engaging with
small firms [14]. It is also consistent with literature on
coopetition that firms would be willing to cooperate for
value creation but turn their positions to be competitors
when it comes to value capture [4, 34]. Not surprisingly,
smaller firms see to cooperate with a platform owner
with the anticipation of potential benefits, but they are
apparently exposed to risks such as misappropriation.
To safeguard this challenge, complementors should
have coopetition capability that effectively manage
tensions between cooperation and competition.

6. Hypothesis development
The literature has elaborated on performance
outcomes in the context of interorganizational
relationships: opportunism, overall satisfaction,
relationship performance, and market performance [6].
In particular, we have focused on relationship
performance as this study examines how coopetition
balance and coopetition capability have an impact on
their relationships with a platform owner. Relationship
performance is described as economic outcomes of a
complementor-platform owner partnership in the form
of profitability, sales volume, market share, marketing
support, and efficiency enhancement [19]. It is about
shared outcomes of involving parities as results of
coopetitive interactions. As relationship performance
refers to the tangible consequences of business
relationship between partners, the use of the construct

will help the academic community understand the
influence of coopetition balance, coopetition capability,
and their joint interaction in the context of the platform
ecosystem.
It is reported that coopetition can be a productive
strategy when a firm establishes a reasonable balance
between competing perspectives [13]. This present
study acknowledges existing understandings and further
examines the impact particularly in the relationship
between coopetition balance and relationship
performance. Coopetition balance mitigates the adverse
effects of the imbalance between cooperation and
competition. In case complementors face situations
where competition suffocates cooperation, the
competitive atmosphere is so intense that
complementors hardly trust a platform owner and
opportunistic behaviors get spread quickly. Such
opposing environments hinder complementors or a
platform owner from sharing resources and producing
synergies by complementing each entity’s limitations.
On the other hand, complementors or a platform owner
may be complacent in case cooperation trumps over
competition. They may have a tendency to do what is
required or demanded instead of developing innovations
for changing business environments. Without having
the leeway to exchange adequate and reciprocal
feedback with each other, the relationship would put a
conformance to the standards and race to the bottom
cost. This type of collaborative pressure can be stressful,
particularly when a platform owner puts self-interest
first and takes advantage of complementors. When
cooperation and competition are balanced on the side of
complementors, however, such adverse effects can be
controlled and lead coopetition into products results.
When complementors reach a dynamic equilibrium
between cooperation and competition, comparable
emphasis on each element is place for their strategy, and
it keeps opposing in check. It may be understood that
cooperation and competition have inherent trade-offs.
This is in line with the dilemma view of tensions. On the
contrary to this view, the paradox theory presents the
“natural and persistent” view, indicating that firms
continue to respond to paradoxical situations instead of
one-time solutions [22]. In other words, rivalrous spirit
and mutual cooperation should take place at the same
time, and complementors may target common goals and
share resources while putting their best efforts to attain
excellence over the other. Consequently, the harmony
between cooperation and competition enables
complementors to drive positive results together, and we
present a hypothesis:
H1: Complementors’ coopetition balance is
positively related to relationship performance in the
context of the platform ecosystem.

Page 5761

Coopetition capability is likely to have a direct
impact on relationship performance as it offers an
institutional framework that monitors ongoing
interactions between a platform owner and the
complementor. In other words, coopetition capability is
associated with complementors’ capacity to properly
manage tensions arising from the paradoxical
coexistence of cooperation and competition and helps
formulate adaptability to fast-changing circumstances
more effectively. The paradox theory argues that the
“natural and persist view” of tensions is related to
opportunities
for
learning
and
adaptability.
Complementors are willing to work together with a
platform owner that provides significant resources. In
the course of doing so, there is a chance that
complementors may settle down with relational inertia
being more content with the status quo and being less
efficient and innovative. Relational inertia drives firms
to be complacent with what they have and to be less
proactive in their own advances on novel and new
approaches [13]. In case a platform owner strategically
decides to enter the place space of a complementor, its
coopetition capability will defend competition threats
and dampen negative influences instead of facing
challenges with no preparation. Research shows that the
market entrance of a platform owner may hurt
complementors in a short run, but it will strengthen the
platform ecosystem with more benefits in the long run
[15]. In particular, volatile changes in relationships, a
complementor’s capability understanding cooperation
and competition will furnish principles, procedures, and
proactiveness by alleviating opportunism and elevating
relationship performance. As coopetition capability
provides complementors with solving problems quickly
and accomplishing performance targets, we present the
following hypothesis:
H2: Complementors’ coopetition capability is
positively related to relationship performance in the
context of the platform ecosystem.
An interesting research question is whether the joint
use of coopetition balance and coopetition capability is
more effective in fostering relationship performance
then individual use. It is a common strategy that
complementors pursue decreasing costs by utilizing a
platform’s resources and increasing growth by having
more access to a platform’s customer base. In doing so,
complementors face inevitable challenges that a
platform may enter into their product space and increase
variances in returns. Just as complementors’
dependence on a platform’s infrastructure, business
processes,
and
customer
interactions,
so
complementors’ smartness should grow by being
dynamically equipped with coopetition balance and

coopetition capability. We argue that synergetic effects
could exist for relationship performance when both
coopetition balance and coopetition capability are
simultaneously in place. Coopetition balance provides
firms with stability by “offsetting potential challenges
and keeping opposing forces in check” [13, p. 2522]. In
other words, the balance approaches of cooperation and
competition bring firms well-adjusted responses to two
conflicting elements and enhance a firm’s flexibility.
Coopetition capability provides complementors with an
institutional framework that monitors interactions
between the platform owner and the firm. A
combination of coopetition balance and coopetition
capability can pay continued attention to relationship
changes between the platform and complements and
unlock their potentials to grow continually. It is
associated with complementors’ capacity to continue to
assess the current situation and develop their responses
instead of one-time solution based upon the paradox
theory. The combination of coopetition balance and
coopetition capability can offer the firm’s configuration
that understand market changes and reconfigurations
that reorganize their resources and respond to the
market. The two forces offer stimulation for executing
proper strategies. We propose that these together will
lead to better relationship performance.
H3: The impact of coopetition balance on
relationship performance is moderated by
coopetition capability, such that the relationship
becomes stronger in the presence of high coopetition
capability in the context of the platform ecosystem.

7. Research methods
This study selected the platform ecosystem at
Amazon.com for several reasons. Amazon is a leading
online e-commerce platform in the world, and Amazon
marketplace launched in 2000 by enabling third-party
sellers to introduce their products to Amazon customers.
FBA (Fulfillment by Amazon) allows complementors to
use Amazon’s infrastructure for inventory control,
storage, and shipping with pick-and-pack customer
service. Also, research has shown that Amazon enters
complementors’ market for reorganizing their product
quality and profit-maximizing strategies [34]. Although
a different platform would be a good candidate,
Amazon.com is arguably the most appropriate setting to
investigate the impact of coopetition.
The survey questionnaire was created and
administered to senior-level management. Although this
research hired a professional data collection company
for recruiting Amazon vendors, the survey
administration and data collection processes were under
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the control of the authors. The use of a data collection
company increased our ability to cover the intended
population of this study and then enhanced the
generalizability of the research results.
Prior to conducting a large-scale survey, we
conducted a pilot study with two ways: four academic
researchers who have sufficient knowledge and
experiences in IS, operations, and management and 64
vendors that do their businesses with Amazon.
Following a check on convergent and discriminant
validity, necessary changes were made. A large-scale
survey was administered to test the research model. A
total of 625 Amazon vendors who were qualified for the
survey were invited to answer the survey, and 365 firms
completed it, resulting in a 58.4% response rate.
Respondents held job titles such as C-level executives,
vice presidents, directors, or senior managers. Table 1
presents the demographic features of the samples in this
study. Response/non-response bias was examined by
comparing the earlier responses with the later ones. A
Chi-square test on annual sales and number of
employees showed no significant difference.
Table 1. Demographic features of the sample
Category
Home & Kitchen
Health & Personal Care
Clothing & Accessories
Books & Movies
Toys & Games
Sports & Outdoors
Beauty
Grocery & Gourmet Food
Tools & Home Improvement
Pet Supplies
Office Products
Patio, Lawn & Garden
Automotive
Arts, Crafts & Sewing
Baby Products
Jewelry
Cell Phones & Accessories
Other
Annual Sales
Less than $100,000
$100,000 – $500,000
$500,000 – $1 million
$1 million – $5 million
Over $5 million
Number of Employees
1–5
6 – 10
11 – 50

Percent
10.4%
10.4%
13.4%
6.3%
6.8%
4.4%
6.3%
6.0%
2.7%
3.0%
6.3%
0.5%
1.4%
4.1%
1.6%
3.0%
5.8%
7.4%
25.8%
21.9%
18.1%
18.1%
16.2%
18.9%
7.4%
12.9%

51 – 100
101 – 500
501 – 1,000
Over 1000

13.2%
20.3%
19.2%
8.2%

7.1. Measures
We adapted existing items for cooperation [5, 9, 33],
coopetition capability [1], and relationship performance
[6, 19]. Our survey employed multiple-item measures
for all of the construct. In particular, we used latent
congruence modeling to develop coopetition balance
from separate items of cooperation and competition.
Latent congruence modeling is a variation of structural
equation modeling that was recently advocated as a
useful tool to measure congruence between two
competing constructs [12, 23]. The modeling is
especially relevant in the context of coopetition that
emphasizes fit between two conflicting concepts in the
platform ecosystem. Latent congruent modeling
controls
for
measurement
errors,
examines
measurement equivalence, and provides a more relevant
measure of congruence. It creates two second-order
factors from two components of interest: mean (i.e.,
level) and differences (i.e., congruence) based upon the
formula below.
Level = |Cooperation + Competition|/2
Congruence = |Cooperation-Competition|
In the context of this study, the level implies the
average of cooperation and competition, and the
congruence represents similarity in the extent of
cooperation and competition. Coopetition balance is
proxied by congruence [23]. A higher congruence score
indicates a greater difference between cooperation and
competition. It means dissimilarity rather than similarity
and overemphasizes one of the two activities instead of
pursuing both. As greater coopetition illustrates a
smaller difference between cooperation and
competition, we multiplied congruence scores by -1 to
help interpretations.
This study included five control variables: (1)
relationship length with Amazon, (2) extent of using
FBA, (3) percent of sales with Amazon, (4) overall
sales, and (5) number of employees. These variables are
chosen to control for complementors’ dependence on
Amazon and their size. Controlling for these variables
will better examine the impact of coopetition balance
and coopetition capability on relationship performance.
To decrease the common method bias, we followed
the guideline proposed by Podsakoff et al. [25]. A
Harman’s one-factor test was employed for common
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method bias. Results show five factors accounting for
80.39 percent of total variance (eigenvalue > 1) and the
first factor accounted for 15.64 percent of the variance.
The test suggests that common method bias is not a
concern.

7.2. Measurement properties and hypothesis
testing
This study conducted analyses in two main steps: (1)
factor analysis through structural equation modeling and
(2) hypothesis testing through regression analysis.
Confirmatory factor analysis was implemented with
Amos to assess measurement properties in our dataset.
The measurement model using Amos showed a good fit
(Chi-Square/d.f. = 2.737, NFI = .932, CFI = .955, IFI =
.955, RFI = .920). The RMSEA value is .061 with 90%
confidence level stretching from .055 to .068. All factor
loadings were greater than .70 and were highly
significant. Values of Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .89
and .94, as shown in Table 2. The results showed that
convergent validity deemed to be established. AVE in
all constructs was greater than .500. Discriminant
validity was examined by the square root of AVE for the
associate construct which needs to be higher than all
other correlations. The data used in this study had no
concern with discriminant validity. Table 2 provides a
correlation table with Cronbach’s alpha, AVE, and
composite reliability for this study.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations

1
2
3
4

CA a
.89
.92
.87
.94

CR b
.88
.92
.87
.94

AVE c
.61
.71
.64
.76

1

2

3

.24d
.26
.46

.10
.23

.14

Cronbach’s alpha, b Composite reliability, c Average
variances extracted, d Squared correlation; 1:
Cooperation, 2: Competition, 3: Coopetition capability, 4:
Relationship performance
a

We employed hierarchical ordinary least squares
regression to test hypotheses postulated in this study. A
three-step procedures were taken to investigate the
impact of control variables at stage 1, of the main effects
of coopetition balance and coopetition capability at
stage 2, and of the moderating effect of coopetition
capability between coopetition balance and relationship
performance. Note that variables were mean-centered in
order to reduce the potential for multicollinearity [10].
The regression results show that both coopetition
balance and coopetition capability are statistically
positive related to relationship performance, supporting

H1(β = .17, p < .05) and H2 (β = .61, p < .01), as shown
in Table 3. In order to assess the presence of the
interaction term, we examined the change in R2 between
Model 2 and Model 3 [10]. In addition, a simple slope
analysis was conducted to inspect the form of
interaction. This test was done by calculating simple
sloes between plus and minus one standard deviation
from the moderator’s mean and evaluated the
coefficients at both levels [10]. The results in Figure 1
are based on unstandardized results.
The analysis uncovers two important findings. First,
there is a significant moderating effect between
coopetition balance and coopetition capability,
supporting H3 (β = .38, p < 0.01), as shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Summary of regression results
DV: Relationship Performance
Variables
Model 1 Model 2
Longevity
0.03
0.02
Fulfilled by
0.04
0.01
Amazon
% of Sales with
0.11
0.03
Amazon
Sales
0.18**
0.03
Number of
-0.02
-0.02
Employees
Coopetition
0.17**
Balance
Coopetition
0.61***
Capability
Coopetition
Balance ☓
Coopetition
Capability
Adjusted R2
ΔAdjusted R2
ΔF

0.06
4.78***

0.40
0.34
106.31***

Model 3
0.04
0.04
0.01
0.02
-0.03
0.15***
0.95***

0.38***

0.43
0.09
16.09***

*p < .10, **p < .05; ***p < 001; The items reported are
standardized regression coefficients. DV: Dependent
variable, Variance inflation factor (VIF) were calculated
to examine multicollinearity. VIF values are less 2.3,
suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern.

Results also show that it is much more effective
when coopetition balance and coopetition capability are
launched together. When the level of both coopetition
balance and coopetition capability is high, relationship
performance exhibits much stronger achievements that
a level of both cases (i.e., 6.41 vs. 3.53), as shown in
Figure 1. Second, the impact of coopetition balance
ameliorates significantly in the present of coopetition
capability, demonstrating the vital moderating role of
coopetition capability. While complementors with a low
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level of cooperation capability show improvements in
relationship performance regardless of levels of
coopetition balance, firm equipped with a high level of
cooperation capability made a noteworthy leap from
5.25 to 6.41 under low and high coopetition balance,
respectively. Taken together, the simple slope analysis
presents an evidence of moderating role of coopetition
capability.

Figure 1. Interaction effect between
coopetition capability and coopetition balance

8. Discussion
The success of the platform ecosystem relies heavily
on the dynamic collaboration of complementors and a
platform owner [21, 30], but the strategic alliance can
be polluted by direct competition due to a platform
owner’s entry into complementors’ product space [34].
As a result, coopetition is established, and tensions are
likely to be intensified under the condition of
scarcity[22]. Unfortunately, complementors are placed
in the position of scarcity such as a lack of customer
access and logistical infrastructure. Coopetition can
provide a crucial foundation for steady cooperation to
complement each entity’s goals, while unnecessary
stress and defense can hurt their sound relationships.
This study helps academicians and practitioners
understand how to increase positive responses and
reduce negative tensions in the context of coopetition.

8.1. Implications for research
The first theoretical contribution of this study is to
provide a theory-based research model that reveals how
to enhance relationship performance through
coopetition balance and coopetition capability. The
literature has called for studies on bring together the
apparent divide between cooperation and competition to
shed light on the reality firms face in the current
business environment [15]. As the field of coopetition

has been drawn attention from researchers and
practitioners, its nature and management have been
illuminated [13, 15]. Studies, however, are generally
theoretical or anecdotal, and empirical studies are rare.
This study makes a contribution to literature by
providing a theory-driven, empirically-tested model that
nurtures a firm’s agility via coopetition and that utilizes
resources to have an advantageous position in a
coopetitive environment. Additionally, this study has
employed latent congruence modeling to develop
coopetition as the method incorporates measurement
errors and model covariance among individual items
under
cooperation
and
competition.
This
methodological provision as part of finding coopetition
balance gives robust insights into the literature. Firms
need to harness tensions arising from cooperation and
competition, resulting in enhancing positive responses
and negative impacts.
The second theoretical contribution of this study to
elaborate on coopetition with a contextual focus on a
platform-based
market.
Product/service-based
strategies have been losing ground to platform-based
strategies. As the network economy has been
emphasized as part of value creation, a motto, “Forget
Products and Forge Platform,” is prevalent in the
business field. A platform mediates relationships
between consumers and complementors together with
feedback reinforcing strategies of complementary
products and attracting more users. Studies have
centered on platform owners as a focal point of interest:
platform owners’ pricing decision [8, 27] and
interactions between competing platforms [7].
However, studies on concentrating on complementors,
producing significant values to a platform, are in need
of more attention, and this perspective will give more
holistic approaches to understanding a platform
ecosystem. Also, research has focused on positive
impacts of cooperation between a platform owner and
complementors. Studies, on the other hand, emphasizes
dark sides of collaboration, often called “swimming
with the shark”, need receive more attention to
investigate how small firms can produce benefits.
Platform owners and complementors have established
their interfirm relationships with cooperation and
engage in competition as part of ecosystems [15]. For
example, Intel avoids direct competition with
competitors, but enters markets when complements’
products are underperforming by signaling innovations
through competition [34]. Amazon has begun providing
own products to customers directly, leading to
competition with complementors. Complementors
should be aware of their strategic position with regard
to coopetition emphasizing value creation, cooperation,
value appropriation or competition. This study provides
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significant values with regard to value cocreation in the
perspective of complementors.
The third contribution of the study is to provide two
coequal capacities (i.e., coopetition balance and
coopetition capability) and their individual and
interaction effects on relationship performance. The
literature has acknowledged positive and negative
effects of coopetition [2, 13], and the mixed results are
requested to be reconciled. In other words, coopetition
can damage value for both parties on the contrary to
their expectations, and its negative impact should be
much worse on complementors than on a platform
owner due to its size and resources. As firms should go
through three steps of accepting, accommodating, and
differentiating/integrating [28] with regard to
coopetitive strategies, complementors should be aware
that coopetition is ongoing responses rather than onetime resolution. That is, coopetition balance and
coopetition capability are dynamic flexibility that
complementors need to possess for their adaptive
capacity. In the platform ecosystem, establishing
cooperative relationships between complementors and a
platform owner via proper communication and respect
are crucial to creating path-breaking products [21].
Competition seems to be detrimental to the relationship
in the platform ecosystem, the literature presents that it
will reinforce their capacities over time [15]. Not only
does coopetition balance helps sustain the stability of
two forces but also it motivates firms to stay alert and
continue for better performance. More critically,
coopetition balance deters complementors to fall into
complacency or stay the status quo. Complementors
should manage ostensibly incompatible goals of
cooperation and competition. While cooperating,
complementors should strengthen their competitive
advantage. With the complexity of the market
landscape, taking an approach with coopetition
capability open up more opportunities.

complementors should also increase competitive
approaches toward a platform owner and find a balanced
way.
The present study finds the presence of joint effects
of coopetition balance and coopetition capability. The
results of the study suggest that complementors pursue
both coopetition balance and coopetition capability
jointly in dealing with coopetition. Coopetition balance
has a significant impact on relationship performance
significantly, but there is also a moderating impact of
coopetition capability on relationship performance.
Regression coefficients indicate that moderating effects
of coopetition capability between coopetition balance
and relationship performance is higher than that of the
individual effect of coopetition balance on relationship
performance. Pursuing evenness of cooperation and
competition is critical for sustaining competitive
advantage. When the balance is combined with a firm’s
capacity to manage paradoxical coexistence through
coopetition capability, their adaptive capacity will be
intensified.
It is noteworthy to mention that coopetition
capability is more influential than coopetition balance
and interactions between coopetition balance and
coopetition capability. While coopetition balance
focuses on the evenness of cooperation and competition,
coopetition capability is the ability to respond to the
coopetition by seeking alternative strategies and to
continuously adjust their relationship with the platform
owner. It is also called evaluative capability that
assesses situations, makes sense of realities, and
responds to changes effectively. From the outset of the
partnership, complementors should not only focus on
the compliance with the platform owner but also
develop an organizational capability to manage tensions
and prepare themselves for changing markets.

8.2. Implications for practice

This study contributes to the literature by adding
values with conceptually theorizing and empirically
testing coopetition capability and coopetition balance as
important leverages that firms can cope with the
environmental change. We extend prior research mainly
conceptually examined. Delving into the concept of
coopetition, more sophistically, our theory considers the
impact of coopetition capability and balance as the
positive consequences. In the face of such tensions from
coopetition, balance and capability can fuel
complementors’ adaptive capacity in the platform
ecosystem.

This study has implications for managers who face
competition in the platform ecosystem. Complementors
may have engaged with a platform owner with the
expectation of cooperation. As their products/services
show potentials for growth, a platform owner may
entertain a second thought and even decides to directly
compete with complementors. This study finds a
positive and significant impact of coopetition balance
on relationship performance. It indicates that
complementors should not merely focus on cooperation
with a platform owner, but should prepare themselves
for the competitive circumstances. As competitive
pressures from a platform owner stream into
relationships and gradually erode the customer base,

9. Conclusion
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